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Abstract
This paper develops a simple growth model with moral hazard contracting to examine the
interactions between the organizational mode of rms and economic productivity growth. The
organizational mode of rms diers in terms of the degree to which decisions of R&D investment
are delegated to a manager. We show that the market size restricts the extent of delegation
with respect to R&D, which in turn determines the productivity growth rate of the economy.
We then show that there exist multiple equilibria: \partial decentralization equilibrium" with
a low growth rate and \full decentralization equilibrium" with a high growth rate. Finally, we
study the eects of social capital and competition on equilibrium organizational modes and show
that, under some parametric conditions, these factors induce more decentralized organization and
higher productivity growth while lowering the risk of the economy converging to a poverty trap.
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1 Introduction
Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776) has long been a touchstone for studies of economics.1 It is
well-known that Smith (1776) pointed out the importance of the division of labor to the improvement
of worker productivity, and this improved productivity contributes to the economic growth of nations.
Since the industrial revolution, the market economy has been sophisticated, and the relationships
among markets and rms have been recognized as a main determinant of economic growth. Since
Smith's time, the question of how to coordinate labor within rms, or more generally, the question of
how to organize rms themselves in the context of the market economy has become one of the most
crucial issues for driving economic growth. Addressing himself to this task, Coase (1937) provided us
with a novel view of the rm in a market economy. The crux of his view is the transaction cost, and he
asserts that a rm should exist in a market in order to deal with this cost more eciently. Following this
argument, Williamson's studies (1975, 1985) have elaborated the theory of transaction cost, and his
theory has led the development of research on organizational economics. In particular, the approach of
incomplete-contracting models has continued to oer insightful views of organizational modes within
rms. In this way, since the very origin of economics, economists have continued to be interested in
the organization of rms and have fruitfully investigated the topics of organizational eciency, the
interaction between markets and rms, and the greater question of how these relationships inuence
the economic growth of nations.
Economists have developed a range of theories to address these issues but have produced compar-
atively less in the way of empirical evidence.2 Recently, however, some empirical studies on organiza-
tional economics have discussed choices of organization-specically, the delegation of decisions within
rms and the impact of the same on rm performance-as they relate to the productivity growth of the
economy. For example, Bloom et al. (2009) nd that, while conditional on size and industry, countries
with high social capital, such as trust or rule of law, are generally associated with more decentralized
decision-making within rms and that such conditions contribute to enhanced productivity and to
1Formally, the title of this book was An Inquiry Into The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
2We review the theoretical research that discusses organizational modes and the relationship of organization to
economic productivity in the next chapter.
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growth in scale of rms.3 These results are consistent with the argument made by Penrose (1959)
and Chandler (1962) who asserted that decentralization was essential for the creation of large rms.
This is because decentralization could mitigate the burden of the top managers who need to make
ever more decisions as their rms grow larger. Bloom et al. (2009) nd that larger rms are indeed
signicantly more decentralized. The authors emphasize that the importance of this result has to do
with the eective reallocation of resources (i.e., capital and labor) within the economy. Productive
rms need to grow large and take market share from unproductive rms.4
Motivated by these empirical facts, we develop a simplied Shumpeterian growth model a la
Aghion and Howitt (2009), incorporating a moral hazard problem in order to examine the interaction
between organizational modes and productivity growth. In our economy, there are two types of one-
period-lived and risk-neutral individuals, a mass M of capitalists and a mass N + 1 workers. The
economy consists of the following two sectors: a nal good sector and a series of intermediate good
sectors. The nal good sector is perfectly competitive and produces the homogeneous numeraire good
using labor and a variety of intermediate inputs. Each intermediate good sector is monopolistic. The
monopolistic rm owned by a capitalist has access to the most productive technology transforming
one unit of nal good into one unit of intermediate good. The capitalist, however, cannot exploit
these technologies by herself. She must hire one worker as a manager for each intermediate good
sector. Because the number of intermediate good sectors is smaller than that of workers, there is some
positive probability that each worker fails to match with a capitalist. The worker who succeeds in
matching with a capitalist and accepts the contract oered by the capitalist will become a manager
of the intermediate good sector. However, a worker who fails to match a capitalist or rejects the work
as a manager will work as a production worker in the nal good sector. After successfully matching,
the capitalist chooses an organizational mode for each intermediate good sector that she owns. If
the capitalist adopts a centralized organization (hereafter, C-mode), she handles the R&D decision
3Bloom et al. (2010) suggest that this result is able to explain the divergent moves towards decentralization over
time in the developed countries and towards centralization in less developed countries.
4Bloom et al. (2009) introduce some studies that support the importance of reallocation for growth. For example,
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizon (2000, 2006) show that about 50% of productivity growth in US manufacturing and 90%
in US retail comes from reallocation. Further, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that China and India would experience
a 30% to 60% total factor productivity (TFP) increase if they were to achieve the same eciency in allocating inputs
across production units as the US.
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herself. On the other hand, if the capitalist adopts a decentralized organization (hereafter, D-mode),
the R&D decision is delegated to the manager. Each capitalist decides how many sectors should be
delegated to the manager (i.e., D-mode) and how many to handle herself (i.e., C-mode) among the
sectors she owns.
To make an R&D decision, either the capitalist under C-mode or the manager under D-mode
must choose an unobservable action that stochastically aects the outcome of the R&D (i.e., success
or failure). We suppose each manager is guaranteed by the limited liability; thus, there exists a
moral hazard problem even though both capitalists and managers are risk-neutral. The fact that the
capitalists suer from the moral hazard problem represents the negative aspect of D-mode for the
capitalists. We also suppose that the managers have superior information on the R&D decision to the
capitalists so that they can make R&D decisions more eciently than the capitalists. This represents
the positive aspect of D-mode for the capitalist.5
We use this model to show the characteristics of the equilibrium organizational mode, which de-
pends on market size, the possibility of multiple equilibria and the selection of the same, and the
eects of social capital and competition on the optimal organizational mode. First, this paper shows
that the larger market size promotes the delegation of the R&D decision, which in turn enhances
the productivity growth of the economy. Second, we show that multiple equilibria are likely to occur
when the principal should care about the moral hazard problem.6 These multiple equilibria include a
\partial decentralization equilibrium" with a low growth rate and a \full decentralization equilibrium"
with a high growth rate. Multiple equilibria occur due to the positive feedback mechanism between
decentralization in intermediate good sectors and labor productivity in the nal good sector.7 That
is, the higher the share of D-mode sectors is, the higher the labor productivity is, the higher the
reservation wage of the manager is, the higher the capitalist's benet of choosing D-mode is, and the
5This tradeo of decentralized decision-making between the loss of control and the advantageous information is
usually supposed in literature on decentralization or delegation. See, for example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) or Dessein
(2002).
6Specically, this is the case where the incentive compatibility constraint rather than the individual rationality
constraint is binding.
7As we will introduce in the next section, Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Ishiguro (2010) also derived mul-
tiple equilibria in their contexts. Our multiple equilibria result, however, relies on the feedback mechanism between
decentralization and labor productivity, which substantially diers from theirs.
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higher the share of D-mode sectors becomes, and so forth.8 Whether the economy converges to \full
decentralization equilibrium" or \partial decentralization equilibrium" depends upon the expectation
the capitalist has in equilibrium. The capitalist's expectation inuences the above feedback mecha-
nisms and leads either equilibrium to be a self-fullling equilibrium.9 Finally, we examine how social
capital and competition inuence the properties of equilibrium organizational mode. We show that,
under some parametric conditions, improvements in social capital and enhancement in competition
policy promote greater decentralized organization and higher productivity growth and lower the risk
of the economy converging to a poverty trap. These theoretical results are consistent with the em-
pirical ndings by Bloom et al. (2009, 2010). Moreover, they could oer a proof that the arguments
by Smith (1776), Penrose (1959), and Chandler (1962) have generally provided accurate views of the
relationship between organizational modes and economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the related literature,
Section 3 sets up the basic model with incentive contracting, Section 4 describes the capitalist's choice
of organizational mode, Section 5 characterizes equilibrium and shows that multiple equilibria occur
under some plausible parameter conditions, Section 6 discusses the government policies for improving
social capital and enhancing competition and nally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Following of the pioneering studies of the transaction cost theory by Coase and Williamson, eco-
nomic theory for understanding the determinants of organizational modes within rms has made
great progress in the last three decades.
After the early formulation of the incomplete contracting approach developed by Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) to study the incentive eects of dierent organizational
8We should recall the following points to understand this feedback mechanism: rst, the higher share of D-mode
sectors increases the labor productivity because the manager has better information on R&D decision, and second, the
enhanced labor productivity is associated with a higher reservation value of the manager (i.e., the wage obtained in the
nal good sector). This implies that the cost of adopting C-mode increases, and then, the capitalist is more likely to
adopt D-mode.
9If the capitalist expects full decentralization to occur, then the positive feedback mechanism, which we mentioned
above, would be realized. On the other hand, if each capitalist expects partial decentralization to occur, the negative
feedback mechanism will be realized. The negative feedback mechanism means that the lower the share of D-mode
sector is, the lower the labor productivity is, the lower the reservation wage is, the lower the share of D-mode sector
becomes, and so forth.
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modes, Aghion and Tirole (1997) developed a theory of allocation of formal authority (the right to
decide) and real authority (the eective control over decisions) within organizations. They showed
some conditions where the delegation of formal authority is preferable. The main tradeo in delegating
formal authority is that it enhances the agent's ex ante incentives to acquire information but results
in some loss of control. The authors show that the delegation of decision making enhances the agent's
incentives to acquire information but weakens the principal's incentives to be informed and to control
decisions.10 More recently, Dessein (2002) applies the cheap talk model a la Crawford and Sobel (1982)
and explains why the uninformed principal delegates the decision to the informed agent, although their
preferences are dierent. Unlike Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dessein (2002) supposes that the agent
is better informed in advance, but he focuses on the tradeo in delegating decisions between control
loss and avoiding miscommunication. He shows that the principal would rather delegate control to
the agent with better information than communicate with this agent so long as the divergence in
preferences is not too large relative to the principal's uncertainty about the environment. In both
Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002), a high congruence of preferences between the principal
and the agent is associated with a higher degree of decentralization within rms. Our model does
not explicitly include the parameter that represents such congruency, but one can interpret it such
that the congruence is less under the situation with moral hazard than that without moral hazard.
As in Dessein (2002), we take the information structure as given, in that the agent is assumed to
be better informed in advance. However, our central tradeo under decentralization is one between
availability of better information from the agent and a loss of control due to moral hazard. Thus, the
main tradeo in our model diers from that of these studies.
Our model also has an even more important dierence from previous investigations. Earlier studies
employ a decision theory approach and treat the environment surrounding the rm as given, thus
neglecting the interdependence among the choices that various rms make in the economy. For
example, the attractiveness of decentralization to a certain rm may well depend on whether other
10Also, they nd that without the incentive view, delegating decision making is more likely to occur both when the
decision is less important for the principal due to either little cash ow or high congruence with the agent's preference
and when the decision is more important for the agent due to either high private benet or low congruence with the
principal's preference.
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rms have chosen to be decentralized or not. Moreover, under this decision theory approach, we cannot
explicitly examine how the organizational choice of each rm aects the aggregate productivity of the
economy, which in turn could inuence each rm's choice of organizational mode through changes in
macroeconomic variables. Recently, in order to tackle these issues, Grossman and Helpman (2002),
Acemoglu et al. (2003), Ishiguro (2007, 2010) and others oer a framework in which the organizational
mode of the rm is treated as an equilibrium phenomenon using a general equilibrium model.11
Grossman and Helpman (2002) propose a static, incomplete contracting model in which nal
good manufacturers decide whether to outsource production of intermediate goods or produce them
in-house. They show that dierent organizational modes (outsourcing and vertical integration) can
coexist as multiple equilibria only when there are increasing returns to scale in matching among
intermediate input producers. The key factor to deriving multiple equilibria in their models is the
externality eect yielding the thickness of the market for inputs.12 Acemoglu et al. (2003) also develop
an endogenous growth model with incomplete contracting. They show that in economies behind the
world technology frontier, imitation of existing technologies is more important, and vertical integration
is preferred. However, as an economy approaches the world frontier, the value of innovation increases,
and rms are induced to outsource in order to be able to focus on innovation activities.13 The key
factor to deriving organizational change in their model is the property of technological progress.
Ishiguro (2007, 2010) propose an alternative general equilibrium model of a rm's decentralization
decision using a moral hazard contracting approach. Ishiguro (2010) develops a search theoretic model
with moral hazard contracting to explain how and why diversity of organizational modes arises en-
dogenously. The organizational mode within rms diers in terms of the degree to which decisions are
delegated to a manager. He shows that dierent organizational modes (decentralization and central-
11In addition to the works mentioned hereafter, this paper is closely related to the recent literature on growth and
contracts. For example, Francois and Roberts (2003) and Martimont and Vardier (2004) show how a high rate of
creative destruction may discourage long-term relationships within rms. This paper also relates to recent work on
vertical integration decisions in international trade like Antras (2003) and Grossman and Helpman (2005). Moreover,
Thesmar and Theonig (2000) study the endogenous choice of rms' organizational structures in a Schumpeterian growth
model. However, they abstain from an explicit discussion of agency costs and rather emphasize how dierent internal
structures aect wage dierences between skilled and unskilled workers.
12The more frequently other nal good manufacturers choose to outsource productions of intermediate goods, the
more attractive it becomes for a given manufacture to do so as well.
13In vertically integrated rms, owners have to spend time on both production and innovation activities, and this
creates managerial overload and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the man-
agerial overload but creates a hold up problem.
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ization) can coexist as multiple equilibria for the same parameter value of the model. The key factor to
deriving multiple equilibria in his model is the dynamic search market mechanism.14 Ishiguro (2007)
also develops a two-period overlapping generations model with moral hazard contracting to explain
how organizations change organizational modes to govern transactions and how such organizational
change leads to an endogenous process of economic development. He argues that the equilibrium
organizational mode depends upon the nancing cost underlying the economy. He also shows that
there exist multiple equilibrium paths, some of which converge to the steady-state with decentralized
organization while others converge to the steady-state with centralized organization.
Although our model shares a number of interests with these studies, our focus is dierent still.
We focus on the eects of the moral hazard problem on organizational modes within rms and pro-
ductivity growth rather than the results of the incompleteness of contracts, which have been derived
by Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Acemoglu et al. (2003). As it applies the moral hazard con-
tract approach, our model could be interpreted as an extension of Ishiguro (2007, 2010). However, our
model incorporates moral hazard into a simplied Shumpeterian growth model a la Aghion and Howitt
(2009). Such a simple model brings at least two benets. First, we can provide a theoretical model
that explicitly addresses empirical ndings concerning the relationship between organizational modes
within rms and productivity growth. Second, we can additionally and relatively straightforwardly
nd some policy implications regarding organizational modes within rms and economic growth.
3 The Model
3.1 Production and Prot
We consider an economy of an innite sequence of discrete time periods indexed by t = 0; 1; 2;    . In
each period, there are two types of individuals, a mass N + 1 of workers and a mass M of capitalists.
All of them live for one period and are risk-neutral. Each worker is endowed with a unit of labor-skill
but no wealth, while each capitalist owns a continuum 1M of intermediate good production sites but
14The intertemporal linkage between the current and future contract choices plays a crucial role in deriving the
endogenous diversity of organizations. The optimal contract choices by the current period owners depend on the
reservation value of the managers, which, in turn, depends on what contracts will be oered by owners in the future
periods. By deriving the steady-state points of such a recursive structure of search market equilibrium, the diversity of
production organizations arise as multiple steady-state equilibria.
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no labor-skills. Because each capitalist owns a continuum 1M of intermediate good production sites,
there exists a continuum 1 of intermediate goods in this economy (i.e., M 1M = 1).
A unique nal good, which also serves as the numeraire, is produced competitively by using labor
inputs and a continuum 1 of intermediate good inputs. The nal good production function is
Yt = N1 t
Z 1
0
At(i)1 xt(i)di; (1)
where Nt is the number of production workers in period t,15 At(i) is the productivity parameter that
reects the quality of an intermediate good i in period t, xt(i) is the ow of intermediate good i used
in nal good production in period t, and  2 (0; 1). The nal output is used not only for consumption,
but also for an input to produce the intermediate goods.
The prot function of the nal good producer is
Yt   wtNt  
Z 1
0
pt(i)Txt(i)di;
where pt(i) is the price of the intermediate good i, wt is the wage for production workers, and T is the
parameter that expresses the eciency of contract enforcement. Trading between a nal good producer
and an intermediate good producer incurs transaction costs in the form of iceberg costs. Suppose that
a nal good producer wants to use one unit of the intermediate good for her own production. Then
a nal good producer needs to purchase T  1 units of intermediate goods. This dierence between
T and 1 captures the degree of trading costs in this transaction. The nal good producer needs
to invest T   1 units of intermediate good in the verication technology by which she can commit
herself to pay for one unit of good in the intermediate good market.16 As such, T increases when
it becomes more dicult for the nal good producer to make a credible payment commitment. We
could thus interpret T as the parameter value measuring the eciency of contract enforcement. The
strength of legal institutions aects the eciency of contract enforcement. When the intermediate good
producer (or nal good producer) can successfully sue for breach of contract including overdue and
15As we will discuss later in detail, in equilibrium, workers with size 1 become the managers of intermediate good
sectors, and the remaining workers with size N become the production workers in the nal good sector.
16Although we only consider the case where the verication cost is paid by the nal good producer, the main impli-
cation of this paper does not change even if we consider the case where the verication cost is paid by the intermediate
good producer.
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non-payment, this will make contracts easier to enforce and will lower the transaction cost. However,
the parlous legal system makes formal prosecution of such behavior extremely dicult, which raises the
transaction cost. Besides formal legal institutions, there exists a variety of social arrangements that
facilitate corporation and improve the eciency of contract enforcement. These social arrangements
are often labeled as \social capital". Social capital takes a variety of forms including formal legal and
political institutions, informal norms, trust, culture, and the like. Therefore, we could interpret T
more broadly as the parameter value measuring the quality of social capital in this economy.
Because of the perfect competition, the nal good producer can get zero prot. Then, from rst
order conditions, the inverse demand schedules for each intermediate good i and for production workers
are
pt(i) = T 1(NtAt(i))1 xt(i) 1; (2)
wt = (1  )N t
Z 1
0
At(i)1 xt(i)di: (3)
A continuum 1M of intermediate good production sites are owned by one capitalist. In each
intermediate good sector, there is one production site owned by the capitalist who has access to the
most productive technology At(i) capable of transforming one unit of the nal good into one unit
of the intermediate good with productivity At(i). So this leading rm can enjoy monopoly power
in each intermediate good market. However, in order to exploit each intermediate good production
technology, the capitalist has to hire one worker as a manager. That is, we assume that the capitalist
cannot exploit these intermediate good production technologies by herself.17
Here, for clarity of explanation, we will continue our discussion under the assumption that the
capitalist has already succeeded in employing one manager for each intermediate good production
site. Under this assumption, the site owned by the capitalist can be seen as a monopolistic rm in
each intermediate good sector. Thus, the gross prot of monopolist rm i is
t(i) = fpt(i)  1gTxt(i): (4)
The cost of production is therefore equal to the quantity produced Txt(i). Here, following Acemoglu,
et al. (2006), we implicitly assume that there is a competitive fringe of rms who can steal this
17We will later explain our specication with respect to this point in detail.
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technology and produce the same intermediate good without the production site. However, this fringe
faces higher costs of production and needs ^ (> 1) units of the nal good to produce one unit of the
intermediate good, where 1 < ^  1=. The parameter ^ captures the technological factors as well as
government regulations aecting entry. A higher ^ corresponds to a less competitive market. Thus,
the monopolist rm should care about this limit price constraint, pt(i)  ^, because otherwise the
competitive fringe could protably undercut its price. Therefore, the monopolist rm decides its price
so as to maximize t(i) in (4) subject to (2) and pt(i)  ^. Then, we obtain an equilibrium price as
follows.
pt(i) = minf^; 1

g  ; (5)
which implies an equilibrium quantity:
xt(i) = (=T)
1
1 NtAt(i); (6)
and an equilibrium prot:
t(i) = NtAt(i); (7)
where   (   1)(=) 11 T  1  . Here we can conrm that @@T < 0 and @@ > 0 hold. Thus,
improvements in contract enforcement and a less competitive market lead to a higher prot. Moreover,
substituting (6) into (1) and (3), we obtain an equilibrium nal good output and its wage rate as
follows.
Yt = (=)

1 T
 
1 NtAt; (8)
wt = At; (9)
where At 
R 1
0
At(i)di and   (1 )(=) 1 T
 
1  . Both Yt and wt are proportional to the aggre-
gate productivity parameter At, which is just the unweighted numerical average of all the individual
productivity parameters of the intermediate good. In addition, we can conrm that @@T < 0 and
@
@ < 0 hold. Thus, improvements in contract enforcement and a more competitive market lead to a
higher market wage.
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3.2 Matching
Each capitalist owns a continuum 1M of intermediate good production sites but cannot exploit these
production technologies by herself. In order to exploit these technologies, each capitalist has to hire
one worker as a manager for each intermediate good production site. Here, we assume that each
worker has the necessary skills to exploit these technologies.
As in Ishiguro (2010), we consider the following simple matching process between workers and
capitalists. At the beginning of each period, each capitalist with a continuum 1M of projects (i.e., the
management of intermediate good production sites) enters the matching market to nd one worker as
a manager for each intermediate good production site. Each worker also enters the matching market
in order to nd an opportunity to work as a manager. However, the total number of projects (i.e.,
M 1M = 1) is always smaller than the number of workers (i.e., 1 < 1+N). Thus, projects are always on
the short side of the matching market. For simplicity, we suppose that each match between a project
and a worker occurs in favor of the short side of the market. That is, a player on the short side of the
market can certainly nd a trading partner. Applying this short-side principle in the current model,
we can ensure that each project surely meets a worker, while each worker fails to match with a project
with some positive probability. Here, workers are assumed to be rationed randomly.
On the one hand, the worker who succeeds in matching a project can be a potential manager of
an intermediate good production site. Alternatively, he can always decline to work as a manager
even when he matches a project if he wants to do so. In that case, such worker will be a production
worker in the nal good sector to earn the competitive labor market wage wt. On the other hand,
the worker who fails to match a project has nothing but to be a production worker in the nal good
sector. Therefore, in order to exploit intermediate good production technologies, the capitalist has to
oer an acceptable wage contract to the matching worker.
3.3 Innovation and Organizational Modes
In each intermediate good production sector, the monopolistic rm has an opportunity to attempt
an innovation. The rm can realize innovation through R&D. The probability of success in R&D
12
depends on the organizational mode of the rm and the level of R&D eort by either the capitalist
or the manager. As we will explain later, the subject who exerts this eort is determined by the
organizational mode, which is chosen by the capitalist.
The productivity of the monopolistic rm i at period t At(i) is
At(i) =
(
sAt 1 if R&D succeeds;
fAt 1 if R&D fails;
(10)
where
  s   f > 0; f  1:
Following the specications of Aghion and Howitt (2009), we assume that the rm can innovate by
building upon the previous technology. That is, innovations build on the knowledge stock of the
country; therefore, they multiply At 1.18 This specication implies the existence of intersectoral
spillover eects among the intermediate good production sites. If the R&D succeeds, the innovation
occurs and creates a new version of the intermediate product with the productivity parameter of
sAt 1, which is larger than that of fAt 1 created when R&D fails. Thus, the gross prot of
intermediate good production site i in period t is given by the following:
t(i) =
(
NtsAt 1  st (i) if R&D succeeds;
NtfAt 1  ft (i) if R&D fails:
(11)
We consider two dierent organizational modes of the rm. We call the organizational mode in
which the R&D decision is made by the capitalist centralized organization or simply, C-mode. On the
other hand, we call the organizational mode in which the R&D decision is delegated to the manager as
decentralized organization or simply, D-mode. After matching one worker, each capitalist decides on
an organizational mode for each intermediate good production site. Precisely, she decides how many
projects (e.g., R&D decisions) she carries out by herself (i.e., she adopts C-mode) and how many
projects she delegates to the manager (i.e., she adopts D-mode). Let kt 2 [0; 1] (resp. 1  kt 2 [0; 1])
18In chapter 11 of Aghihon and Howitt (2009), intermediate rms have two ways to generate productivity growth:
(1) they can imitate existing world frontier technologies At 1; and (2) they can innovate upon the previous local
technology At 1. Specically, the productivity of the intermediate good production site i at period t is given by
At(i) =  At 1 + At 1, where the terms  At 1 and At 1 refer to the imitation and the innovation components of
productivity growth, respectively. In this paper, we ignore the imitation components and only consider the innovation
components explicitly. Daido and Tabata (work in progress) consider both imitation and innovation and study the
relationship between organizational modes and the technology frontier.
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to be the share of sites where the capitalist employs C-mode (resp. D-mode) among 1M sites she owns.
Note that kt is a choice variable by the capitalist. Under C-mode (resp. D-mode), the outcome of
R&D, either success or failure, depends upon the eort for R&D taken by the capitalist (resp. the
manager). The eort choice is assumed to be binary. We denote the capitalist's (resp. the manager's)
eort exerted for R&D under C-mode (resp. D-mode) as aC 2 f0; 1g (resp. aD 2 f0; 1g), where
ai = 0 represents a low eort and ai = 1 is a high eort, for i = C;D. Then, we assume that
R&D will succeed with probability pC(aC) 2 (0; 1) (resp. pD(aD) 2 (0; 1)) but fails with 1  pC(aC)
(resp. 1   pD(aD)) under C-mode (resp. D-mode). We also assume that pC(1) = pC , pD(1) = pD,
pC(0) = pD(0) = p0, C  pC   p0 > 0, and D  pD   p0 > 0. Dene p  pD   pC . Throughout
this paper, then, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1.
p  pD   pC > 0:
The probability of success in R&D depends upon the organizational mode. Specically, the probability
of success in R&D under D-mode will be higher than that under C-mode when a high eort is
exerted for R&D. This assumption implies that the manager is more productive than the capitalist
when carrying out the task of R&D investment. This assumption is justied by the following two
arguments. First, in general, the fact that the manager can proceed to the task more eciently due to
his informational advantage is often assumed as a positive eect of delegation.19 Secondly, and a more
specic reason in our model, the capitalist has more tasks (e.g., the choices of organizational modes,
the designing of wage contracts, R&D decisions on other sites, etc.) than the manager. Therefore, on
average, the productivity of the manager with respect to R&D decisions for a particular site would be
higher than that of the capitalist because the manager can concentrate solely on his R&D decision.20
The capitalist's eort cost of R&D depends upon the number of projects z^t for which she chooses
aC = 1 among ktM projects under C-mode (i.e., z^t  ktM ). Thus, the capitalist incurs the action cost
19See, for example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) or Dessein (2002).
20An empirical study by Acemoglu et al. (2007) shows that rms closer to the technological frontier are more likely
to choose decentralization because they are dealing with new technologies about which there is only limited historical
information publicly available. This empirical result is partly consistent with our specication that the probability of
success in R&D under D-mode will be higher than that under C-mode.
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~ct(z^t) when she chooses aC = 1 for z^t projects and aC = 0 for the remaining ktM   z^t projects. Here,
~ct(z^t) is specied as
~ct(z^t) = c(z^t)At 1; (12)
where c0(z^t) > 0, c00(z^t) > 0 and c000(z^t) > 0. c0(z^t) > 0 implies that the capitalist must incur a higher
cost as she carries out more projects and exerts aC = 1 for them. c00(z^t) > 0 implies that the capitalist's
marginal cost of action becomes larger when she exerts a high eort for more projects. c000(z^t) > 0
implies the convexity of the marginal cost function.21 Moreover, we specify that the capitalist's action
cost is proportional to At 1 to ensure balanced growth. Here, for notational simplicity in the following
discussion, let zt 2 [0; 1] be the share of sectors where the capitalist chooses aC = 1 among ktM projects
under C-mode. Then, we can represent z^t as ztktM (i.e., z^t =
ztkt
M ).
On the other hand, the manager's eort cost of R&D does not depend upon the number of projects
because each manager deals with only one matched project. Thus, the manager's cost of R&D ~dt(aD)
simply depends upon the action he chooses and is specied as
~dt(aD) =
(
dAt 1  ~dt if aD = 1;
0 if aD = 0:
(13)
The manager's action cost is also assumed to be proportional to At 1 to ensure balanced growth.
3.4 Contracts and Organizational Modes
After matching one worker to each intermediate good production site, the capitalist decides on an
organizational mode for each site. If the capitalist adopts C-mode, the R&D decision is made by the
capitalist herself. On the other hand, if the capitalist adopts D-mode, the R&D decision is delegated
to the manager. We assume that the capitalist cannot observe the manager's eort choice for the
R&D decision. The veriable signals are the only realized outcomes of each R&D projects - success
or failure. This means that the capitalist suers from a moral hazard problem under D-mode. Thus,
under D-mode, a contract oered to the manager should specify the payment to him contingent on
the veriable outcome. Let Wt = fwst ; wft g be a contract oered to the manager under D-mode in
period t where wst (resp. w
f
t ) represents the payment when R&D succeeds (resp. fails) in R&D.
21c000(z^t) > 0 is assumed for simplicity of the following discussion. The main conclusion of this paper does not change
without this specication.
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Unlike D-mode, the capitalist does not suer from a moral hazard problem under C-mode because
she makes the R&D decision herself. Thus, under C-mode, the capitalist species a xed payment wt
to the manager because he does not choose unobservable action and hence is not subject to incentive
problem. Recall here that the manager is still necessary for the production of the intermediate good
even when he is not delegated the R&D decision. Therefore, the capitalist oers a contract with a
xed wage just to compensate the manager's reservation value, wt (i.e., the wage for the production
worker in the nal good sector).
Now, we summarize the timing of events in the following way.
(i) The intermediate good production sites owned by the capitalists are matched with workers at
the beginning of period t. According to the short-side principle, each site surely meets a worker,
while there is some positive probability that each worker fails to match a site.
(ii) The capitalist chooses an organizational mode for each intermediate good production site. More
specically, the capitalist decides the share of intermediate good production sites (kt 2 [0; 1])
where she adopts C-mode and also (1  kt 2 [0; 1]) where she adopts D-mode among 1M sites
(iii) The capitalist oers contracts to the matched workers according to the organizational modes
she has chosen.
(iv) Each matched worker chooses whether to accept or reject the contract. If he rejects it, then
he works as a production worker in the nal good sector. If he accepts it, then he works as a
manager in an intermediate good production site.22
(v) Given the contracts, the capitalists and the managers choose their actions simultaneously.
(vi) Outcomes are realized and payments are made according to the contracts.
22The worker can be a potential manager only for the initial matching project in the intermediate good sector. If he
rejects the contract oered by a matched project, he has nothing but to be a production worker in the nal good sector.
Thus, whether the worker receives a wage contract of a D-mode project or that of a C-mode project depends upon the
initial matching.
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4 Optimal Contracts and Organizational modes
4.1 The Capitalists' Eort Choices Under C-mode
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal contract under each organizational mode. In each
period t, the capitalist chooses an optimal organizational mode, either C-mode or D-mode, as well as
the associated optimal contracts oered to the manager. In that stage, the capitalist takes the market
wage rate wt as given because she regards her eect on the market wage to be negligible.
Now, we examine the capitalists' eort choices under C-mode given kt. The capitalist has ktM sites
where she could make the R&D decision by herself. Then, she has to choose the share of projects zt
where she exerts a high eort aC = 1 among ktM sites. Under C-mode, the manager will be paid the
xed wage wt because he is necessary for production even when he is not given the R&D decision, and
hence, he is compensated just for his reservation value. Given this, the capitalist's expected payo
from the sites under C-mode is given by
kt
M
h
ztfpCst (i) + (1  pC)ft (i)  wtg+ (1  zt)fp0st (i) + (1  p0)ft (i)  wtg
i
  ~ct(ktzt
M
): (14)
Here, the rst (resp. second) term in the bracket means the expected net revenue from a certain sector
i by choosing aC = 1 (resp. aC = 0). The last term in (14) indicates the capitalist's eort cost of
R&D. Then, the capitalist chooses zt 2 [0; 1], the share of sites with aC = 1 among ktM sites, so as to
maximize equation (14). Throughout this paper, we assume that choosing aC = 0 for any sites under
C-mode is not optimal for the capitalists. The following conditions support this assumption:
Assumption 2.
Ct(i)  ~c0t(
1
M
);
where t(i)  st (i)   ft (i) = NtAt 1.23 By dierentiating (14) with respect to zt, we obtain
Ct(i)   ~c0t(ktztM ) > 0 under Assumption 2. Thus, Assumption 2 ensures that it is optimal for the
capitalist to choose aC = 1 for all sites under C-mode (i.e., zt = 1). Hence, the capitalist's expected
payo under C-mode is given by
kt
M
fpCst (i) + (1  pC)ft (i)  wtg   ~ct(
kt
M
): (15)
23Parameter conditions for which this assumption holds are discussed in Appendix A. Appendix A shows that this
assumption holds under a large set of parameter values.
17
4.2 The Optimal Contracts under D-mode
We consider the optimal contract under D-mode. As mentioned in the previous section, we assume
that all the managers are risk neutral but protected by limited liability. Thus, the capitalists face
the standard moral hazard problem. By delegating the R&D decision to the manager, the capitalist
can save her eort cost and have access to the better R&D success probability, but she may have to
incur the agency cost due to the unobservability of the manager's actions and the limited liability
constraints.
First, we will solve the following standard contracting problem when the capitalist wants to im-
plement aD = 1 from the manager:
 Problem (D1)
max
(wst ;w
f
t )
pD(st (i)  wst ) + (1  pD)(ft (i)  wft )
subject to
pDwst + (1  pD)wft   ~dt  wt (IR)
pDwst + (1  pD)wft   ~dt  p0wst + (1  p0)wft (IC)
wst  0 and wft  0: (LL)
Recall that wst (resp. w
f
t ) denotes the rewards to the manager when R&D succeeds (resp. fails) in
each site. The rst constraint indicates the individual rationality constraint (IR) for the manager.
Note that the reservation value for the manager is the marker wage wt. The second constraint is
the incentive compatibility constraint (IC), which induces the manager to choose aD = 1 instead of
aD = 0 under the contract Wt = (wst ; w
f
t ). Finally, (LL) is the limited liability constraint ensuring
that the manager receives non-negative rewards whether R&D succeeds or not.
The optimal solution to the above problem is given as follows.24 (a) When ( p
D
D
) ~dt   ~dt > wt, the
optimal contract is (wst ; w
f
t ) = ( ~dt=D; 0). In this case, (IC) binds. (b) When (
pD
D
) ~dt   ~dt  wt, the
24We briey give a proof in Appendix B.
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optimal contract is (wst ; w
f
t ), which satises (IR) with equality and (LL). One of these is (wst ; w
f
t ) =
((wt + ~dt)=pD; 0).
In the former case (a), (IC) is binding, while (IR) becomes slack. In this case, the capitalist must
give the manager positive information rent over his reservation value wt in order to induce aD = 1 from
him. Therefore, the expected payo of the manager ( p
D
D
) ~dt   ~dt becomes higher than his reservation
value wt, and thus, the capitalist suers from the agency cost. One implication derived from this
result is that the delegation of R&D decision gives the manager more power to extract higher rewards
~dt=D, which reects his informational advantage over the capitalist in the organization. In other
words, the reward for the D-mode (delegated) manager is determined by the internal logic of the
organization and is not necessarily equal to the outside market value (the reservation wage). Hence,
in the case (a), the reward of the delegated manager is not sensitive to the change in outside market
value. This is in contrast to the case of C-mode in which R&D decision is not delegated to the
manager, and hence his reward falls to his reservation wage.
However, in the latter case (b), (IR) is binding, while (IC) becomes slack. In this case, the capitalist
does not have to give the manager positive information rent over his reservation value wt in order to
induce aD = 1 from him. This is simply because the reservation market wage wt is so high that the
constraint (IC) becomes negligible relative to the constraint (IR). The informational advantage over
the capitalist gives the manager power to extract higher rewards only when constraint (IC) is binding.
Therefore, the expected payo to the manager equals his reservation value wt; thus, the capitalist
does not suer from the agency cost. In this sense, the unobservability of the manager's action does
not matter for the capitalist in case (b).
Summarizing these arguments, when aD = 1 is implemented, the payo of the capitalist from
D-mode at site i is given by
V D1 (i) = p
Dst (i) + (1  pD)ft (i) maxf
pD
D
~dt; wt + ~dtg: (16)
Next, we consider the case where the capitalist wants to implement aD = 0 from the manager.
In this case, unobservability of actions is not subject to incentive problem. Thus, as in the case of
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C-mode, the principal oers the xed payment wt just to compensate the manager's reservation value.
Therefore, when aD = 0 is implemented, the principal's expected payo from D-mode at site i is given
by V D0 (i) = p0
s
t (i) + (1   p0)ft (i)   wt. Here, from (14), V D0 (i) equals the value of expected net
revenue that is achieved when ac = 0 is exerted at a certain sector i under C-mode.
Now, the capitalist has to determine whether she should implement aD = 1 or aD = 0 from the
manager. However, under Assumption 2, implementing aD = 0 from the manager is never optimal for
the capitalist. Assumption 2 indicates that the relation pCst (i)+(1 pC)ft (i) wt  ~c0t( 1M )  V D0 (i)
holds. Thus, suppose the capitalist implements aD = 0 from the manager at a certain site i under
D-mode. She can raise her expected payo by changing this site i to C-mode and exerting high
action aC = 1. Hence, under Assumption 2, implementing aD = 1 from the manager can be a unique
candidate for equilibrium solution. Thus, the capitalist's expected payo from site i under D-mode is
given by
V D(i) = V D1 (i) = p
Dst (i) + (1  pD)ft (i) maxf
pD
D
~dt; wt + ~dtg: (17)
Finally, for simplicity, we focus our analysis on the case where the capitalist's net expected payo
becomes non-negative. The sucient condition for which this assumption holds is given by 25
Assumption 3.
V D(i)  0:
Under Assumption 3, the capitalist always enters the intermediate good production market and oers
acceptable contracts to all matched managers.
4.3 Organizational Modes
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal organizational mode (i.e., the capitalist's choice of kt).
In each period t, given the market wage rate wt, the capitalist chooses organizational modes. Under
parametric conditions for which Assumptions 2 and 3 hold simultaneously, the expected payo for the
25Parameter conditions for which this assumption holds are discussed in Appendix A. Appendix A also shows some
parametric conditions for which Assumptions 2 and 3 hold simultaneously and conrms that these assumptions hold
under a large set of parameter values.
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capitalist with kt share of C-mode sites and (1  kt) share of D-mode sites among 1M sites is given by
kt
M
fpCst (i)+(1 pC)ft (i) wtg ~ct(
kt
M
)+(
1  kt
M
)

pDst (i)+(1 pD)ft (i) maxf
pD
D
~dt; wt+ ~dtg

:
(18)
Then, the capitalist chooses kt 2 [0; 1] so as to maximize her expected payo (18). By dierentiating
(18) with respect to kt, we obtain the optimal kt as follows:
kt =
8><>:
0 if ~c0t(
kt
M ) + pt(i) > maxf p
D
D
~dt   wt; ~dtg;
kt 2 (0; 1) if ~c0t( ktM ) + pt(i) = maxf p
D
D
~dt   wt; ~dtg;
1 if ~c0t(
kt
M ) + pt(i) < maxf p
D
D
~dt   wt; ~dtg:
(19)
L.H.S. of the condition in (19) (i.e., ~c0t(
kt
M ) + pt(i)) represents the marginal cost of choosing C-
mode (or the marginal benet of choosing D-mode). By increasing the number of C-mode projects,
the capitalist incurs more eort cost ~c0t(
kt
M ) and obtains smaller prots due to the lower R&D success
probability pt(i). On the other hand, R.H.S of the condition in (19) (i.e., maxf p
D
D
~dt   wt; ~dtg)
represents the marginal benet of choosing C-mode (or the marginal cost of choosing D-mode). The
term p
D
D
~dt wt represents the case where (IC) is binding under D-mode, while the term ~dt represents
the case where (IR) is binding. By increasing the number of C-mode projects, the capitalist can
marginally save the information rent by p
D
D
~dt   wt when (IC) is binding, while she can save the
payment to the manager by ~dt when (IR) is binding.
From (19), when (IC) is binding under D-mode, the increase in the market wage wt reduces the
capitalist's marginal benet of choosing C-mode and thus increases the share of sectors where the
capitalist employs D-mode. The intuitive mechanism behind this result is explained as follows: under
D-mode where (IC) binds, the payment to the manager is independent of his reservation market wage
wt because his reward is determined by the internal logic of the organization (i.e., the manager's
informational advantage over the capitalist). However, under C-mode, the payment to the manager
equals his reservation market wage wt. Thus, his reward increases with market wage wt. Therefore,
the rise in market wage wt increases the capitalist's benet of choosing D-mode and thus, increases
the share of sectors where the capitalist employs D-mode.
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5 Equilibrium
5.1 Equilibrium Organizational Modes
This section characterizes the general equilibrium of our model. Under Assumption 3, the capitalist
always oers acceptable contracts to all managers. Thus, after matching process, the workers with size
1 become the managers of intermediate good production sites, and the remaining workers with size
N become the production workers in the nal good sector (i.e. Nt = N). From (9), the market wage
wt in this economy is proportional to the aggregate productivity parameter At. Then, the denition
of At implies
At = f
Z 1
0
t(i)digAt 1 = fktC + (1  kt)DgAt 1; (20)
where C  pCs + (1  pC)f , D  pDs + (1  pD)f , and D   C = p > 0. Therefore, the
productivity growth rate of the economy gt is given by
gt  At
At 1
  1 = ktC + (1  kt)D   1:
Here, note that the level of At and the productivity growth rate gt depend upon the share of D-mode
sectors (i.e., 1 kt). Because the probability of success in R&D is relatively higher under D-mode (i.e.,
D > C), the level of At and gt become higher, as the share of D-mode sectors increases. This implies
that both At and gt are decreasing in kt in equilibrium. Then, by substituting (9), (11), (12), (13),
(20), and Nt = N into (19), we obtain the following condition, which determines the organizational
mode in general equilibrium.
kt =
8><>:
0 if c0( ktM ) > R(kt);
kt 2 (0; 1) if c0( ktM ) = R(kt);
1 if c0( ktM ) < R(kt);
(21)
where
R(kt)  maxfRIC(kt); RIRg;
RIC(kt)  p
D
D
d  fktC + (1  kt)Dg  pN;
RIR  d pN:
As described in the previous section, R(kt) = RIC(kt) when (IC) is binding under D-mode, while
R(kt) = RIR when (IR) is binding. Here, we can conrm that the relation R0IC(kt) = p > 0
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holds, while RIR is constant with respect to kt. As shown in Appendix C, the relation RIC(kt) > RIR
(resp. RIC(kt)  RIR) holds for all kt 2 [0; 1] when D < p
D
D
d  d (resp. pDD d  d  C). Thus,
the inequality D < p
D
D
d  d implies the sucient parametric conditions for which (IC) is binding,
while p
D
D
d d  C gives the sucient parametric conditions for which (IR) is binding. In addition,
suppose C < p
D
D
d   d  D, RIC(kt) has one intersection with RIR at k^t 2 [0; 1], as shown in
Figure 7. Thus, when C < p
D
D
d d  D, (IC) is binding when k^t < kt, while (IR) is binding when
kt  k^t. In the following subsections, we focus our analysis on the case where parametric conditions
D < p
D
D
d  d or pDD d  d  C hold. Then, we briey discuss the case C <
pD
D
d  d  D.
5.2 The Case Where (IR) is Binding
This subsection considers the case where (IR) is binding under D-mode (i.e., p
D
D
d   d  C). In
this case, the unobservability of the delegated manager's action does not matter for the capitalist.
Equation (21) is represented as
kt =
8><>:
0 if c0( ktM ) > RIR;
kt 2 (0; 1) if c0( ktM ) = RIR;
1 if c0( ktM ) < RIR;
(22)
where
RIR  d pN:
Figure 1 shows all possible patterns of the relationship between c0( ktM ) and RIR in (22). From (22),
we can conrm that c0(0) > RIR (resp. c0( 1M ) < RIR) holds when N
IR
0 < N (resp. N < N
IR
1 ), where
N IR1  d c
0( 1M )
p
< d c
0(0)
p
 N IR0 . This illustrates the kind of equilibrium that occurs according
to the population size of workers (i.e., N). First, when the population size of workers is suciently
small to satisfy N < N IR1 , c
0( ktM ) < RIR holds for all kt 2 [0; 1], and the unique full centralization
equilibrium (i.e., kt = 1) is realized (see E1 in Figure 1). Second, when that size is intermediate and
in N 2 [N IR1 ; N IR0 ], neither full decentralization (i.e., kt = 0) nor full centralization (i.e., kt = 1) ever
occur, and then, the unique partial decentralization equilibrium (i.e., kt 2 (0; 1) ) is realized (see E2
in Figure 1). Third, when the size is suciently large to satisfy N IR0 < N , the relation c
0( ktM ) > RIR
holds for all kt 2 [0; 1], and the unique full decentralization equilibrium (i.e., kt = 0) is realized (see
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E3 in Figure 1). All of these results imply that the higher the value of N is, the higher the share of
D-mode sectors becomes among the intermediate-goods production sectors.
We could interpret the value of N as reecting the quality adjusted value of labor size. Accordingly,
this value is likely to be larger in developed countries than developing ones because, in general, people
in developed countries have more fruitful opportunities of education or job training. Notice that, from
(6), the value of N reects the size of each intermediate good market. Then, we can learn from Figure
1 that the larger the size of each intermediate good market is, the higher the extent to which R&D
decisions are delegated in the intermediate good sectors. Recall that the higher share of D-mode leads
to higher productivity growth in the economy. These results show, on the contrary, that the market
size would restrict the extent of specialization with respect to R&D, which in turn determines the
productivity growth rate of the economy.
As we noted at the beginning of this paper, Smith (1776) argued that specialization (division of
labor) is one of the most important engines for enhancing labor productivity but that the extent of spe-
cialization is limited by the market size. In this regard, our theoretical result would be consistent with
Adam Smith's view. Also, our model would be consistent with the arguments proposed by Penrose
(1959) and Chandler (1962). They argued that decentralization was essential for the creation of large
rms because CEOs are constrained in the number of decisions they can make. As rms grow, CEOs
need to increasingly decentralize the process of decision-making and delegate it to their managers. As
mentioned in the rst section of this paper, Bloom et al. (2009) conrm these arguments, and nd
that decentralized rms tend to have a higher productivity and that larger rms are signicantly more
decentralized. In our model, the larger market implies the larger workload of each intermediate good
production site. Therefore, our theoretical result would be consistent with the ndings of Bloom et
al. (2009) and thus the views of both Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962) as well.
5.3 The Case Where (IC) is Binding
This subsection considers the case where (IC) is binding under D-mode (i.e., D < p
D
D
d   d). In
contrast to the (IR)-binding case, the capitalist suers from ineciency due to moral hazard. (21) is
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represented as
kt =
8><>:
0 if c0( ktM ) > RIC(kt);
kt 2 (0; 1) if c0( ktM ) = RIC(kt);
1 if c0( ktM ) < RIC(kt);
(23)
where
RIC(kt)  p
D
D
d  fktC + (1  kt)Dg  pN:
From (23), we can conrm that c0(0) > RIC(0) (resp. c0( 1M ) < RIC(1)) holds when N
IC
0 < N
(resp. N < N IC1 ), where N
IC
0 
pD
D
d D c0(0)
p
and N IC1 
pD
D
d C c0( 1M )
p
. As in the (IR)-binding
case, the kind of equilibrium realized depends on the population size of workers (i.e., N). When the
population size of workers is suciently large (resp. small) to satisfy N IC0 < N (resp. N < N
IC
1 ),
full decentralization (i.e., kt = 0) (resp. full centralization (i.e., kt = 1)) could be a candidate for the
rational expectation equilibrium.
For clarity of discussion, we add the following parametric assumptions:
Assumption 4.
p + c0(0) < c0(
1
M
):
This assumption is likely to be satised when the capitalist's marginal cost of eort is suciently
large in the case where she chooses full centralization (i.e., kt = 1). For example, this assumption
holds when limkt!1 c
0( ktM ) = 1. Under Assumption 4, N IC1 < N IC0 holds. Thus, we can ignore the
parametric regions where both full decentralization (i.e., kt = 0) and full centralization (i.e., kt = 1)
coexist.26
Figures 2 to 5 show the possible patterns of the relationship between c0( ktM ) and RIC(kt) in (23)
under Assumption 4. Figure 2 shows the case where the population size of workers is suciently small
to satisfy N < N IC1 . In this case, c
0( ktM ) < RIC(kt) holds for all kt 2 [0; 1]. Then, the unique full
centralization equilibrium (i.e., kt = 1) is realized (see E in Figure 2). Figure 3 shows the case where
the population size of workers satises the condition of N IC1  N  N IC0 . In this case, neither the full
decentralization (i.e., kt = 0) nor the full centralization (i.e., kt = 1) occur. Then, the unique partial
decentralization equilibrium (i.e., kt 2 (0; 1) ) is realized (see E in Figure 3). Figures 4 and 5 show the
26Even if we consider the case NIC0  N  NIC1 , our results are still almost maintained. In order to avoid an
unnecessarily complicated discussion, we introduce Assumption 4.
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case where the population size of workers is suciently large to satisfy N IC0 < N . In this case, because
c0(0) > RIC(0), full decentralization (i.e., kt = 0) could be a possible outcome. However, there are
two other possible patterns in this parameter region. The rst case is shown in Figure 4. In Figure
4, c0( ktM ) > RIC(kt) holds for all kt 2 [0; 1].27 Thus, the unique full decentralization equilibrium (i.e.,
kt = 0) is realized (see E in Figure 4). The second case is shown in Figure 5. In Figure 5, c
0( ktM )
and RIC(kt) have two intersections k2 and k

3 at kt 2 (0; 1).28 Thus, there are the following three
rational expectation equilibria: (1) the full decentralization equilibrium (see E1 in Figure 5), (2) the
partial decentralization equilibrium with a relatively lower share of D-mode (see E2 in Figure 5), and
(3) the partial decentralization equilibrium with a relatively higher share of D-mode (see E3 in Figure
5). However, it seems that E3 is unstable, while the other two (i.e., E1 and E2) are stable. We can
explain this instability as follows. Suppose that the economy lies in E3, and consider the following
experiment. Due to some parametric changes, kt is increased slightly from k3 . In this case, as shown
in Figure 5, the relation c0( ktM ) < RIC(kt) holds. The capitalist has an incentive to increase kt until it
reaches k2 , and thus the economy eventually converges to E2. Next, we consider another experiment.
Due to some parametric changes, kt is decreased slightly from k3 . In this case, as shown in Figure 5,
the relation c0( ktM ) > RIC(kt) holds. The capitalist has an incentive to decrease kt until it reaches 0,
and thus the economy eventually converges to E1. These experiments imply that E3 is not sustainable
when exogenous parametric changes are explicitly considered. In this sense, E3 is unstable. Therefore,
there exist two stable equilibria E1 and E2 in Figure 5.
Notice that the feedback mechanism between decentralization and the aggregate productivity
parameter At results in multiple equilibria. Due to the advantage in R&D success probability under
D-mode, the rise in the share of D-mode increases the level of aggregate productivity parameter At.
This rise in At leads to the high reservation value of the manager (i.e., wt) because wt is proportional
to At. Recall that the payment to the manager is independent of wt under D-mode where (IC)
27The sucient condition for Figure 4 is given by 1
M
c00(0) > R0IC(0) = p . Under this condition, c
0( kt
M
) and
RIC(kt) have no intersection at all kt  0.
28The sucient condition for Figure 5 is that RIC(k) > c
0( k
M
) holds for k such that 1
M
c00( k
M
) = R0IC(k). Suppose
we specify c( kt
M
) as bln(a)   bln(a   kt
M
), where a > 1 and b > 0. In this case, k is given by M [a   ( b
Mp
)1=2].
Therefore, the condition RIC(k) > c
0( k
M
) is expressed as
( p
D
D
)d (D pMa) pN
2(Mp)1=2
> b1=2.
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binds but that payment under C-mode is increasing in wt. These results imply that the rise in wt
increases the capitalist's cost of choosing C-mode. Thus, the capitalist is more likely to choose D-
mode. Therefore, the higher the share of D-mode is, the higher the values of At is, the higher the value
of reservation wage wt is, the higher the share of D-mode is, and so forth. This feedback mechanism
between decentralization and the aggregate productivity parameter works only when (IC) is binding,
and thus, multiple equilibria occur only when (IC) is binding.
Whether the economy converges to E1 or E2 in Figure 5 depends upon the expectation that
each capitalist has in equilibrium. On the one hand, suppose each capitalist expects that the full
decentralization occurs (i.e., each capitalist expects that other capitalists choose D-mode for all of
their own projects). Then, the expected reservation value of the manager (i.e., wt) becomes suciently
high, which in turn makes choosing D-mode more attractive for each capitalist. Therefore, the positive
feedback mechanism between decentralization and the aggregate productivity parameter works. Thus,
the result of full decentralization (i.e., kt = 0) and the higher productivity growth (i.e., g

t = 
D 1) is
realized as a self-fullling equilibrium at E1. On the other hand, suppose each capitalist expects that
the partial decentralization occurs (i.e., each capitalist expects that other capitalists do not choose
D-mode for all of their own projects). Then, the expected reservation value of the manager becomes
suciently low, which in turn makes choosing D-mode less attractive for each capitalist. Therefore,
the negative feedback mechanism between the centralization and the aggregate productivity parameter
works. Thus, the result of partial decentralization (i.e., kt 2 (0; 1)) and the lower productivity growth
(i.e., gt = k

t 
C + (1   kt )D   1) is realized as a self-fullling equilibrium at E2. Therefore, the
equilibrium organizational mode depends upon how each capitalist forms her own expectation about
the intentions for others. An empirical study by Bloom et al. (2009) nds that cultural factors
such as religion and regional trust play crucial roles in accounting for cross-regional dierences in
the organizational mode within rms.29 It has also been argued often that these cultural factors
play substantial roles for coordinating people's expectation. These results suggest that our multiple
equilibria result could provide some possible explanations for Bloom et al. (2009) empirical ndings.
29Barro and McCleary (2006) argue that religious practices and beliefs have important consequences for economic
growth.
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Figure 6 shows some numerical examples for which multiple equilibria emerge. The dotted line
shows c0( ktM ); the solid line shows RIC(kt) when N = 21:8; the dashed line shows RIC(kt) when
N = 22:8; and the dash-dot line shows RIC(kt) when N = 23:8, respectively. In this numerical
example, we specify the capitalist's R&D cost function c( ktM ) as bln(a)   bln(a   ktM ), where a > 1
and b > 0. The parameter values for the base-line simulation are summarized in Appendix D. These
numerical examples conrm that multiple equilibria occur under some plausible range of parameter
values.
Finally, the results obtained from Figure 2 to Figure 6 show that the higher the value of N is, the
higher the share of D-mode in the intermediate good sectors is. Thus, analogous to the case where (IR)
is binding, the market size restricts the extent of specialization with respect to R&D, which in turn
determines the productivity growth rate of the economy. Moreover, the decentralized organization
is more likely to emerge as the workload of each intermediate good production site becomes large.
Therefore, even in the case where (IC) is binding, our results could be related to the view of Smith
(1776) as well as to those of both Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962).
5.4 Mixed Case
In this subsection, we consider the parameter region where (IC) is binding and that where (IR) is
binding coexist (i.e., C < p
D
D
d  d  D). In this case, however, it is dicult to provide rigorous
illustrations of all possible patterns of the relationships among c0( ktM ), RIC(kt), and RIR in (21). Thus,
we only present one intuitive example shown in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows that (IR) is binding when
kt  k^t (i.e., RIR  RIC(kt)) and (IC) is binding when kt > k^t (i.e., RIR < RIC(kt)).
As in the cases of the previous subsections, the realized equilibrium depends on the population size
of workers (i.e., N). First, when the population size of workers is suciently small to satisfy N < N IC1 ,
c0( ktM ) < RIC(kt) holds for all kt 2 [0; 1]. Thus, the unique full centralization equilibrium (i.e., kt = 1)
is realized (see E1 in Figure 7). Second, when the size satises the condition of N IC1  N  N IR0 , the
unique partial decentralization equilibrium (i.e., kt 2 (0; 1) ) is realized (see E2 in Figure 7). Third,
when the size is suciently large to satisfy N IR0 < N , c
0( ktM ) > RIR holds for all kt 2 [0; 1]. Then,
the unique full decentralization equilibrium (i.e., kt = 0) is realized (see E3 in Figure 7). Therefore,
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as in the previous cases, we can also conrm that the higher the value of N is, the higher the share
of D-mode sectors becomes in the intermediate good sectors.30
6 Policy Analysis
6.1 The Eciency of Contract Enforcement
This subsection examines how the policy that improves eciency of contract enforcement between
the nal good producer and the intermediate good producer inuences the equilibrium organizational
mode within rms. Here, recall that the parameter T captures the eciency of contract enforcement
between the nal good producer and the intermediate good producer. Smaller T leads to the smaller
transaction cost between them, while larger T leads to the higher transaction cost. Thus smaller T
corresponds to the case where the government or local community improves the quality of the social
capital that facilitates contract enforcement (e.g., strong legal recourse), while larger T corresponds
to the case where the quality of social capital is deteriorated (e.g., weak legal recourse).
In order to avoid lexicographic explanations and to shed light on intuitive policy implications, we
focus our analysis on the case where (IC) is binding under D-mode (i.e., D < p
D
D
d   d).31 Then,
we rst consider the case where the unique partial decentralization equilibrium is realized as shown
at E in Figure 3. By totally dierentiating the condition c0( ktM ) = RIC(kt) in (23) with respect to kt
and T , we obtain
dk
dT
> 0: (24)
The derivation of (24) is explained in Appendix E. This result is summarized in Figure 8. Improve-
ments in contract enforcement by decreasing T shift the RIC(kt) line downwards. The equilibrium
E shifts leftward, and thus, the equilibrium organizational mode becomes more decentralized. The
intuitive mechanism behind this result is explained as follows. Improvement in contract enforcement
30Moreover, we can show some examples where multiple equilibria occur in this case. However, key factors to derive
multiple equilibria are the same as those discussed in the previous subsection. Therefore, in order to avoid repetitive
explanation, we do not discuss it explicitly here.
31When (IR) is binding under D-mode (i.e., p
D
D
d   d  C), from (22) and Figure 1, improvements in contract
enforcement by decreasing T shift the RIR line downwards, and thus, equilibrium E2 shifts leftward. Therefore, the
equilibrium organizational mode becomes more decentralized. The intuitive mechanism behind this result is simple.
Improvements in contract enforcement increase the capitalist's prots from superior R&D skills which increases the
capitalist's benet from choosing D-mode.
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increases the capitalist's prots from superior R&D skills, which increases the capitalist's benet of
choosing D-mode. Moreover, improvement in contract enforcement increases the reservation value of
the manager (i.e., the market wage), which again increases the capitalist's benet of choosing D-mode.
These two factors promote the more decentralized organizational mode.
This policy implication becomes more profound in the case where multiple equilibria emerge as
shown in Figure 5. Again, by totally dierentiating the condition c0( ktM ) = RIC(kt) in (23) with
respect to kt and T , we obtain
dk2
dT
> 0 (25)
dk3
dT
< 0 (26)
The derivation of (25) and (26) are explained in Appendix E. These results are summarized in Figure
9. Improvements in contract enforcement by decreasing T shift the RIC(kt) line downwards. Thus,
equilibrium E2 shifts leftward (i.e.,
dk2
d > 0), and E3 shifts rightward (i.e.,
dk3
d < 0), respectively.
Moreover, suppose the shift of RIC(kt) is suciently large, and c0( ktM ) > RIC(kt) holds for all kt 2
[0; 1]. In this case, the partial decentralized equilibrium is eliminated, and thus, the unique full
decentralization equilibrium is realized, as shown in Figure 4. This indicates that the economy can
escape from the partial decentralized equilibrium characterized as a low growth rate. Therefore,
improvements in contract enforcement promote the more decentralized organizational mode and lower
the risk of the economy converging to a poverty trap.32
An empirical study by Bloom et al. (2009) nds that social capital as proxied by regional trust and
\Rule of Law" is strongly associated with more decentralized rms. The trust measure is developed
using the World Values Survey, which aims at measuring generalized trust (i.e., the overall level of
trustworthiness in a society). The Rule of Law measure is developed by the World bank and measures
\the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the court, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence" (Kaufmann et al., (2007)). Bloom et al. (2009) also argue that social capital can improve
32The intuitive mechanism behind these results is analogous to the case in Figure 8.
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aggregate productivity through facilitating greater rm decentralization. Both regional trust and Rule
of Law are strongly related to the eciency of contract enforcement. Therefore, our theoretical results
complement these empirical ndings and arguments of Bloom et al. (2009).
6.2 Competition Policy
This subsection examines how the policy that enhances competition in the intermediate good market
inuences the equilibrium organizational mode within rm. Here, recall that the parameter ^ captures
the technological factors as well as the government regulations aecting entry into the intermediate
good market. Therefore, from (5), a lower  corresponds to the case where the government enhances
competition policies (e.g., encouragements to entry), while a higher  corresponds to the case where
the government enhances anti-competition policies (e.g., promotion of patent protections).
In order to avoid lexicographic explanations and to shed light on intuitive policy implications, we
focus on the case where (IC) is binding under D-mode (i.e., D < p
D
D
d  d).33 We rst consider the
case where the unique partial decentralization equilibrium is realized as shown at E in Figure 3. By
totally dierentiating the condition c0( ktM ) = RIC(kt) in (23) with respect to kt and , we obtain
dk
d
(
< 0 if 1    ;
> 0 if     1 :
(27)
where   1
+(1 ) kC+(1 k)DpN
. Derivation of (27) is explained in Appendix F. This result is
summarized in Figure 10. Suppose the monopoly power of the capitalist's rm is already suciently
large (i.e.,     1 ), the enhancement of a competition policy by decreasing  shifts the RIC(kt)
line downwards, and thus, the equilibrium E shifts leftward. Therefore, the equilibrium organizational
mode becomes more decentralized. However, suppose the monopoly power of the capitalist's rm is
suciently small (i.e., 1    ), the enhancement of a competition policy by decreasing  shifts
the RIC(kt) line upwards, and thus, the equilibrium E shifts rightward. Therefore, the equilibrium
organizational mode becomes more centralized. Figure 10 shows the eects of a competition policy on
33When (IR) is binding under D-mode (i.e., p
D
D
d   d  C), from (22) and Figure 1, the enhancement of a
competition policy by decreasing  shifts the RIR line upwards, and thus, equilibrium E2 shifts rightward. Therefore,
the equilibrium organizational mode becomes more centralized. The intuitive mechanism behind this result is simple.
The enhancement of a competition policy decreases the capitalist's prots from superior R&D skills, which in turn
lowers capitalist's benet of choosing D-mode.
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the equilibrium organizational modes. Note that the downward shift of RIC(kt) occurs either when
 decreases for  2 [ ; 1 ] or when  increases for  2 [1; ]. These results imply that whether the
competition policy induces decentralization or centralization of intermediate good sites depends upon
the monopoly power that the capitalist already exercises in the intermediate good market. Suppose
the monopoly power of the capitalist is already suciently large (i.e.,  2 [ ; 1 ]), the enhancement of
a competition policy would induce the decentralization of intermediate good sectors. On the contrary,
suppose the monopoly power is suciently low (i.e.,  2 [1; ]), the enhancement of a competition
policy would induce the centralization of intermediate good sectors.
The intuitive mechanism behind these results is explained as follows. On the one hand, the en-
hancement of a competition policy decreases the capitalist's prots from superior R&D skills, which
lowers the capitalist's benet of choosing D-mode. On the other hand, the enhancement of a competi-
tion policy increases the reservation value of the manager (i.e., the market wage), which increases the
capitalist's benet of choosing D-mode. Then, suppose the monopoly power of the capitalist is already
suciently large, the former anti-decentralization eect is dominated by the latter pro-decentralization
eect, and vice versa. Therefore, when the monopoly power of the capitalist is suciently large (resp.
small), the enhancement of a competition policy induces decentralization (resp. centralization) of
intermediate good sites, and thus the equilibrium organizational mode becomes more decentralized
(resp. centralized).
Moreover, the role of competition policy becomes more profound in the case where multiple equi-
libria emerge, as shown in Figure 5. Again by totally dierentiating the condition c0( ktM ) = RIC(kt)
in (23) with respect to kt and , we obtain
dk2
d
(
< 0 if 1    ;
> 0 if     1 ;
(28)
dk3
d
(
> 0 if 1    ~;
< 0 if ~    1 ;
(29)
where   1
+(1 ) k

2
C+(1 k2)D
pN
, and ~  1
+(1 ) k

3
C+(1 k3)D
pN
. Derivation of (28) and (29) are
explained in Appendix F. These results are summarized in Figure 11. Supposing the monopoly power
of the capitalist's rm is already suciently large (i.e.,     1 ), the enhancement of a competition
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policy by decreasing  shifts the RIC(kt) line downwards. Thus, equilibrium E2 shifts leftward (i.e.,
dk2
d > 0 ), and E3 shifts rightward (i.e.,
dk3
d < 0), respectively. Moreover, supposing the shift of
RIC(kt) is suciently large, c0( ktM ) > RIC(kt) holds for all kt 2 [0; 1]. In this case, the partial decen-
tralized equilibrium is eliminated, and thus, the unique full decentralization equilibrium is realized,
as shown in Figure 4. Therefore, the economy may escape from the partial decentralized equilibrium
characterized by a low growth rate. However, suppose the monopoly power of the capitalist's rm
is suciently small (i.e., 1    ^). The policy implication then becomes the opposite. In this
case, the enhancement of anti-competition policy by increasing  shifts the RIC(kt) line downwards
and thus eliminates the risk of the economy converging to the partial decentralization equilibrium.
Therefore, whether the competition policy may lower or raise the risk of the economy converging to
a poverty trap (i.e., the partial decentralization equilibrium) depends upon the monopoly power that
the capitalist already exercises in the intermediate good market. Suppose the monopoly power of the
capitalist is already suciently large. The enhancement of a competition policy would then lower the
risk of the economy converging to a poverty trap. However, supposing the opposite, the enhancement
of anti-competition policy would lower the risk of the economy converging to a poverty trap.34
An empirical study by Bloom et al.(2009) nds a signicant positive association between compe-
tition and decentralization. In our model, this positive relation holds when (IC) is binding and the
monopoly power of the capitalist's rm is suciently large. In this sense, our theoretical result could
provide some possible explanations for the empirical ndings of Bloom et al.(2009). However, out
model indicates that the eect of competition on organizational mode may not be straightforward.
The competition policy may induce more centralized organization under some parametric conditions.35
Therefore, further theoretical and empirical investigation is necessary on this issue.
34The intuitive mechanism behind these results is analogous to the case in Figure 10.
35Competition is likely to aect rm decentralization for several reasons. First, more competitive environments put
a greater emphasis on rapid reaction to events. In these circumstances, delegating decisions to managers with local
information will be particularly benecial. Second, if competition is associated with an increased number of rms,
it makes yardstick competition easier to implement and therefore enables the CEO to combine decentralization with
increased managerial eort. Finally, if competition increases the threat of bankruptcy, then the manager is more
likely to make the rm's value maximizing decision if the CEO delegates. Because this paper employs a very simple
framework for our main argument, we do not consider these elements explicitly. This may be one of the reasons why
our model predicts a positive relationship between competition and decentralization in a limited range of parameter
values. However, we believe that the policy intuition obtained in this paper is crucial for a rigorous understanding of
the eect of competition on organizational form.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a simple growth model with moral hazard contracting to examine the
interactions between organizational modes within rms and economic productivity growth. Through
this model, we show that greater prevalence of decentralization leads to higher productivity growth in
the economy. This result implies that the market size restricts the extent of delegation with respect
to R&D, which in turn determines the productivity growth rate of the economy. We could argue that
these results are consistent not only with recent empirical ndings by Bloom et al (2009, 2010), but
also with the traditional view of Smith (1776). We also show that there exist multiple equilibria that
represent a \partial decentralization equilibrium" with a low growth rate and the \full decentralization
equilibrium" with a high growth rate, respectively. Finally, we examine the eects of social capital
and competition on the organizational modes and nd that, under some parametric conditions, these
factors induce more decentralized organization, higher productivity growth and lower risks of seeing
the economy converge to a poverty trap.
Recent empirical research on the relationship between organizational modes within rms and
economic growth has provided the opportunity to revisit the reasons for the existence of the rm
and its role in the market economy. Moreover, through this lens, we need to elaborate the theoretical
models that interact with these empirical ndings. We believe that such interactions between empirical
and theoretical investigations enhance our understanding of the theme of this paper.
Appendix A
This section shows some parametric conditions for which Assumptions 2 and 3 hold simultaneously.
First, we consider Assumption 2. By substituting (11), (12), and Nt = N into Assumption 2 and
rearranging it, we obtain the parametric condition for Assumption 2 as 36
N  c
0( 1M )
C
: (A1)
Second, we consider Assumption 3. By substituting (9), (11), (13) and Nt = N into Assumption
36Note that the relation Nt  N holds in this model. The minimum value of Nt (i.e., N) is achieved when the
capitalist employs all matched managers. Here, in order to obtain sucient parametric conditions for Assumptions 2
to 4, we consider the case where Nt = N holds.
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3, we obtain the following inequalities :
DNAt 1  maxf p
D
D
dAt 1; At + dAt 1g
From the denition of At (i.e., At 
R 1
0
At(i)di), the maximum value of At that is potentially achieved
in this model is expressed as DAt 1 where D  pDs + (1  pD)f (i.e., At  DAt 1). Thus, the
sucient conditions for the above inequalities are expressed as
DNAt 1  maxf p
D
D
dAt 1; DAt 1 + dAt 1g:
By rearranging the above inequalities, we obtain the sucient parametric conditions for Assumption
3 as
N  maxf
pD
D
d
D
;
D + d
D
g: (A2)
Therefore, Assumptions 2 and 3 hold simultaneously when the population size of workers is suciently
large to satisfy (28) and (29).
Appendix B
Given implementing aD = 1, the capitalist minimizes her expected payment, w
f
t +pD(wst  wft ) under
(IR), (IC), and (LL). By substituting (IR) with equality into (IC), we have
~dt + wt   wft
pD

~dt
D
(IC')
On the one hand, if (IC') satises at wft = 0, then the optimal contract is determined by holding
(IR) with equality. Note that this condition can be represented by ( p
D
D
) ~dt   ~dt  wt. One such
contract is (wst ; w
f
t ) = ((wt + ~dt)=pD; 0).
On the other hand, if (IC') does not satisfy at wft = 0, then the optimal contract is determined by
holding (IC) with equality. Note that this condition can be represented by ( p
D
D
) ~dt   ~dt > wt. Thus,
the optimal contract is (wst ; w
f
t ) = ( ~dt=D; 0).
Obviously, these contracts satisfy (LL).
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Appendix C
This section shows some parametric conditions for which (IC) is binding (i.e., RIC(kt) > RIR) and
some for which (IR) is binding (i.e., RIC(kt)  RIR), respectively. The relation RIC(kt) > RIR
(RIC(kt)  RIR) is rewritten as
(
pD
D
)d  d > ()[ktC + (1  kt)D]:
Thus, suppose ( p
D
D
)d   d > D. We can easily conrm that the relation RIC(kt) > RIR holds for
all kt 2 [0; 1]. Analogously suppose ( p
D
D
)d   d  C . The relation RIC(kt)  RIR holds for all
kt 2 [0; 1]. Moreover, suppose C < ( p
D
D
)d   d  D. RIC(kt) has one intersection with RIR at
k^t 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, suppose kt  k^t (i.e., RIC(kt)  RIR). Here, (IR) is binding, while (IC) is
binding when k^t < kt (i.e., RIR < RIC(kt)).
Appendix D
In this section, we briey explain the parameter values of our numerical examples. We set the value
of pD as 0.9, pC as 0.5, p0 as 0.3,  as 0.3, ^ as 1=, s as 6.44, f as 1, M as 2, a as 1=M +0:1, b as
0.1, d as 3.5, and N as 24.8. The one period in this model is assumed to be about 60 years. Thus, we
set the values of s and f to achieve a roughly 3 % balanced growth rate in the full decentralization
equilibrium (i.e., s =
(1:03)60 (1 pD)f
pD
. Given the specication of c( ktM ), Assumption 4 holds if
(aM   1)ap < b. Thus, the values of a and b are adjusted to satisfy the above inequalities. The
value of d is designed so as to satisfy ( p
D
D
)d  d > D. Here, the inequality ( pDD )d  d > D holds
if d  DDp0 . The value of N is also designed so as to satisfy Assumptions 2 and 3 simultaneously.
Appendix E
By totally dierentiating the condition c0( ktM ) = RIC(kt) in (23) with respect to kt and T , we nd
dkt
dT
=  fkt
C + (1  kt)Dg @@T +pN @@T
1
M c
00( ktM )  p
where @@T =  (=)
1
1 T
 1
1  < 0 and @@T =   1  (   1)(=)
1
1 T
 1
1  < 0. Here, note that the
relation 1M c
00( ktM ) > p = R
0
IC(kt) holds at E in Figure 3 and E2 in Figure 5, while
1
M c
00( ktM ) <
36
p = R0IC(kt) holds at E3 in Figure 5 . Therefore, we can easily conrm that inequalities in (24),
(25), and (26) hold, respectively.
Appendix F
By totally dierentiating the condition c0( ktM ) = RIC(kt) in (23) with respect to kt and , we nd
f 1
M
c00(
kt
M
)  pgdkt =  
fktC + (1  kt)Dg@
@
+pN
@
@

d
where @@ =  (=)
1
1 T
 
1  < 0 and @@ =
( 1 )
1  (=)
1
1 T
 
1  > 0. Rearranging the above
equation, we obtain
dkt
d
=
(=)
1
1 
1
M c
00( ktM )  p
pNT
 
1 
1  
 (1  )fktC + (1  kt)Dg
pN
+   1


Here, note that the relation 1M c
00( ktM ) > p = R
0
IC(kt) holds at E in Figure 3 and E2 in Figure 5,
while 1M c
00( ktM ) < p = R
0
IC(kt) holds at E3 in Figure 5 . Therefore, we can easily conrm that
the inequalities in (27), (28), and (29) hold respectively.
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Figure 2: Unique Full Centralization(IC-bind)
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Figure 3: Unique Partial Decentralization (IC-bind)
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Figure 4: Unique Full Decentralization (IC-bind)
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Figure 5: Multiple Equilibria (IC-bind)
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Figure 6: Numeral example of Multiple equilibria (N=21.8, 22.8, 24.8)
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Figure 7: Mixed Case
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Figure 8: Improvements in Contract Enforcement(IC-bind)
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Figure 9: Improvements in Contract Enforcement(Multiple Equilibria)
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Figure 10: Competiton policy (IC-bind)
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Figure 11: Competition Policy (Multiple Equilibria)
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